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At the sitting of 11 September the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Cano Pinto on 
economic and commercial relations between the EC and Brazil, pursuant to Rule 
63 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on External Economic Relations 
as the committee responsible. 
At its meeting of 17 July 1991 the committee decided to draw up a report and 
appointed Mr Porto rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 23 September 1991, 21 September 1992 and 6 October 1992, the 
committee considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Cano Pinto and 
Stavrou, vice-chairmen; Porto, rapporteur; Christensen Ib; De Vries, Dido, 
Groner (for Benoit), Hindley, Killilea (for Guillaume), Marck (for Chabert), 
Melandri, Miranda de Lage, Peijs, Planas Puchades (for Mihr), Rossetti, Sainjon, 
Sonneveld (for Price), Speciale (for Junker), Suarez Gonzalez and Visser (for 
Martin David). 
The report was tabled on 19 October 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A. 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on Economic and Commercial Relations between the European Community and Brazil 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) 2613/82 establishing the first 
framework-agreement on cooperation between the European Economic Community 
and the Federative Republic of Brazil1 , 
having regard to its resolution of 23 January 1987 on economic relations 
between the European Community and Latin America2 , 
having regard to its resolutions of 25 October 1990 on the preservation of 
tropical rainforests3 , 
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Cane Pinto on 
economic and commercial relations between the Community and Brazil (B3-
0882/91), 
having regard to the Commission proposal for a Council decision including a 
new framework agreement on cooperation between the European Economic 
Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil (COM(92) 209 final) , 
having regard to the report by its Committee on External Economic Relations 
(A3-0310/92). 
A. whereas the political transition period which began in 1985 re-established 
democracy and the freedom to exercise individual rights and freedoms, and 
opened the way to modernizing and opening up the Brazilian economy, 
B. whereas relations between the Community and Brazil have hitherto failed to 
reflect the scope for development offered by the two regions, 
C. whereas, in particular, Brazil is both the major customer and supplier of the 
Community in Latin America, accounting for one third of total trade between 
the two regions; whereas, there is, however, a marked deficit on the 
Community side in these commercial exchanges, 
D. whereas the Brazilian economy is under pressure and experiencing serious 
difficulty in controlling inflation and meeting the burden of servicing both 
the external debt and the internal public debt, 
OJ No. L 281, 4.10.1982 
2 OJ No. C 46, 23.2.1987 
3 OJ C 295, 26.11.1990 
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E. whereas the persistence of major social imbalances and marginalization 
conducive to violence continues to be a source of grave concern to the 
Brazilian authorities, 
F. whereas the efforts to attract foreign investment to Brazil would be more 
successful if the Brazilians invested in their economy themselves instead of 
exporting their capital abroad; 
G. whereas the Brazilian Government is about to implement a wide-ranging 
programme of structural economic reforms including fiscal reform and 
deregulation of the economy by privatizing public undertakings and 
liberalising foreign trade, 
H. whereas the Brazilian Government's modernization programme includes a major 
administrative reform which requires the amendment of the Constitution 
itself, 
I. whereas Brazil is particularly committed to the liberalization of trade and 
regional integration in Latin America; mindful, in this connection, that it 
is one of the signatories of the Treaty to establish a common market in the 
Southern Cone of the American continent (MERCOSUL), 
J. whereas, finally, Brazil's demograph~c and economic potential mean that it 
must rank as one of the European Economic Community's major partners in the 
world context, 
1. Welcomes resolute attitude adopted by the new Brazilian administration since 
coming to power in March 1990 with regard to respect for human rights and 
combatting violence; 
2. Believes that this policy must be vigorously pursued, and that the removal 
of current inequalities and marginalization constitutes a sine qua non for 
the success in the medium-term of the economic modernization measures being 
implemented; 
3. Hopes that the current crisis will soon be overcome (and notes the correct 
functioning of the democratic institutions, which inspires confidence in 
their stability), so as to safeguard the current reforms which are essential 
to the country's development and to the greater well-being of its people; 
4. Notes that over the last two years, Brazil has made considerable efforts to 
eliminate the major economic imbalances inherited from the military 
dictatorship; voices its concern, nevertheless, that successive structural 
adjustment plans have as yet failed to achieve the desired results, 
particularly with regard to reducing inflation; 
5. Believes that the control of inflation demands that there be concerted action 
on the part of the government and Brazil's various economic and social 
operators, accompanied by the stepping-up of deregulation measures within the 
country, liberalization of external trade and modernization of the public 
administration; 
6. Believes, moreover, that it is essential that alongside greater 
rationalization in the management of public spending, the fiscal reforms 
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already initiated be given concrete form in the shape of a simplified and 
more equitable system, and ensure the gathering of revenue sufficient to 
cover spending; 
7. Welcomes the initial results of the privatization programme, which has 
already to some extent improved the efficiency of the Brazilian economy and 
achieved a certain reduction of the internal public debt; 
8. Welcomes the process of liberalizing Brazilian external trade which began in 
May 1990 with a plan for the abolition of quantitative restrictions and their 
replacement by tariff duties and the reduction of the tariff levels by 1994; 
in this connection, welcomes the review of the policy of a closed market for 
data-processing equipment, which was highly damaging to the modernization of 
the Brazilian economy; 
9. Believes, nonetheless, that inspite the progressive steps already taken or 
planned, tariff protection continues to be excessive in certain sectors: 
10. Welcomes also the efforts being made by the Brazilian administration to 
reduce port costs, opening up the operation of ports to private bodies and 
seeking to end the trade union monopoly on contracting dockers; 
11. Welcomes the fact that in July 1992, Brazil reached an agreement with the 
creditor banks, on the reduction of its external debt, in keeping with the 
Brady plan, leading to a considerable reduction in the debt and a substantial 
postponement of repayments; welcomes also the agreement reached, in the form 
of a 'debt-for-nature swap', to use the external debt to fund a macro-project 
to preserve the Amazon rainforest; 
12. Believes that it is of major importance that mutually advantageous 
investments be stepped up, and, in this connection, notes that the EC 
International Investment Partners programme could represent a particularly 
useful means of encouraging industrial cooperation between undertakings in 
both regions; 
13. Calls on the Brazilian Government to take appropriate measures to stem the 
flight of capital from Brazil's own potential investors; 
14. Welcomes, in the warmest terms, the decision of the Council of Finance 
Ministers at the ECOFIN in Porta in April 1992 to include Latin America 
amongst the regions selected for loans from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB); proposes to the Bank's Council of Coordinators that it set up an 
operative unit for Latin America with a view to establishing a direct 
dialogue with the region, analysing investment projects and adopting 
appropriate technical decisions with greater dispatch; 
15. Believes that the regulations guaranteeing investments in Brazil and the 
level of protection available for intellectual property remain inadequate, 
and that the revision of Brazilian legislation in the areas constitutes an 
essential step if economic or financial and commercial relationships between 
the two regions are to be put on a more dynamic footing; 
16. Supports the project for a pilot programme for the Brazilian Amazon basin, 
eo-funded by the European Economic Community, the Brazilian Government and 
the World Bank; suggest to the Commission that it encourage regional 
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cooperation between all the Amazonian countries with regard to establishing 
and implementing a strategy for the conservation and rational exploitation 
of the rainforest; 
17. Welcomes the agreement reached with the International Atomic Energy 
Organization, which represents a major contribution to international peace 
and security in Latin America and the world; 
18. Welcomes Brazil's political commitment to proceed with the establishment of 
a common market in the Southern Cone of the American Continent (MERCOSUL); 
observes, however, that th~ programme established for tariff reductions could 
come to grief if imbalances resulting from macro-economic disparities 
distorting competition are not reduced; 
19. Supports the Commission's initiatives with regard to providing technical 
support for the implementation of the next stages of the integration of 
MERCOSUL, drawing on its own experience; 
20. Welcomes the cooperation agreement under consideration, which was signed on 
13 June 1992, believing in particular that it creates opportunities for 
cooperation in new sectors and sets-up mechanisms of particular importance 
not only for strengthening economic relations but also for supporting social 
development and democratic consolidation in Brazil; 
21. With regard to social development, calls on the Commission to set up specific 
programmes without delay, in agreement with the Brazilian Government, with 
a view to implementing each and every one of the measures listed in Article 
21 of the Framework Agreement, particularly in the areas of public health, 
education and subsidized housing; 
22. Calls on the Commission, when implementing this agreement, to encourage 
scientific and technical cooperation by supporting associations and study and 
research centres in both regions, and to collaborate in exchanges of 
knowledge and in finding joint solutions to problems of mutual interest; 
23. Proposes that the Commission should submit an annual report to Parliament on 
the implementation of the agreement so as to enable the latter to assess the 
extent to which the objectives laid down have been met; this report should, 
in particular, publish the results established by the Joint Committee 
referred to in Article 29; 
24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
Commission, the governments of the Member States and the Federative Republic 
of Brazil. 





RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BRAZIL 
1. The direct presidential elections of 15 November 1989 marked the final 
stage of the country's return to democracy, bringing to an end the transition 
period which began in January 1985 with the appointment of Tancredo Neves as 
President of the Republic. 
Twenty years of military dictatorship (1964-84) had preceded the four years of 
liberalization leading to the direct presidential elections: these were seen as 
the culminating point in the consolidation of the return to democracy. During the 
process of liberalization, major achievements had included the promulgation of the 
1988 Constitution, the establishment of a new party system, an amnesty for 
political exiles and the direct election of the governors of the 25 states of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil. 
2. Since it took power on 16 March 1990, the government has had to deal not 
only with a serious ongoing economic crisis but also with the problem of violence 
in a variety of forms, springing not so much from the given circumstances of the 
moment as from major structural backwardness and inequality affecting both the 
economy and Brazilian society. 
Guarantees that human rights will be respected have, understandably, been a 
priority for the authorities, who have taken a resolute stance with regard to 
combatting human rights violations. 
However, the problem is one that can only be resolved if development is 
accelerated and greater equilibrium achieved. Here, closer relations with the 
European Community could be of major importance. 
3. The allegations which lie at the root of the current political cr1s1s are 
grave, and may lead to the destitution of President Collar de Mello; this unhappy 
episode is damaging the country's image and may jeopardize development currently 
under way. 
Nonetheless, we should note both the independence of the Brazilian press and the 
speed with which the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry is carrying out its work 
as evidence of the maturity of the country's democratic institutions. 
In view of the country's problems, it is essential that this crisis be speedily 
resolved if the current process of reform is not to be held up or even 
compromised. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY IN A LATIN AMERICAN AND WORLD 
CONTEXT 
1. Whether in terms of geography, population or economic strength, Brazil is 
not a small country. Its surface area is 8.5m km2, almost four times that of the 
European Community. The population of almost 150m is 43% of that of the 
Community, and its GDP is equal to that of Spain and places it 8th amongst the 
economic powers of the western world. 
Brazil has gained dramatically in importance in this century, particularly in 
recent decades. Its population has increased ten-fold since 1900, and between 
1968 and 1980 economic growth in real terms was at a rate of 8% per annum. 
The importance of the Brazilian economy at world level is due to the positions 
occupied by certain products. This applies to certain agricultural products; 
Brazil is the world's premier coffee and sugar cane producer. It is the second-
largest producer of beef and cocoa, third-largest grain, fourth pigmeat and fifth 
wood. It is the world's second-largest producer of tin and iron, fourth-largest 
of bauxite and magnesium, sixth of gold and eighth of chrome. Domestic oil 
production meets two thirds of national needs, and increased by 5.5% in real terms 
from 1989 and 1990. But Brazil's importance as an industrial power is also very 
considerable, ranking 10th on the world scale. Industry is variegated; we could 
cite annual production figures such as 25m tonnes of steel and 800 000 cars, but 
the country also manufactures aeroplanes, weapons, machine tools and chemical and 
pharmaceutical products. Supply levels for public works are also remarkable. 
Although industrial development has to a great extent been the result of a 
traditional strategy of import substitution, in many sectors Brazilian industry 
is remarkably competitive on the external market, and the volume of exports of 
industrial products in fact exceeds that of agricultural exports. 
The dynamism of the economy, combined with high levels of protection for the 
internal market, have meant that since 1983, Brazil's balance of trade has enjoyed 
sizeable surpluses: in 1990, the surplus was US$10 500m (although this was not 
even enough to meet the charges for servicing the country's external debt, which 
are in excess of US$11 400m). 
2. All this means that Brazil's significance within Latin America is even 
greater, accounting for 38% of the continent's GDP (whereas in the 1960s it was 
only 28%); Mexico accounts for 20.6% and Argentina for 11.7%. Brazil's share is 
naturally far larger in the context of the four MERCOSUL countries, occupying 
three quarters of their combined GDP (77%), followed by Argentina with almost 20%, 
leaving Uruguay and Paraguay with small percentages of the total. 
III. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL 
Since 1962, apart from the period between 1982 and 1987, the Community's 
importance as a trading partner for Brazil exceeded that of the USA. In addition 
to the traditional Brazilian exports of coffee and minerals (and other 
agricultural products), the volume and range of industrial exports, particularly 
steel products and transport-related materials is growing; in relation to imports, 
the diversity of capital goods and intermediate goods indispensable to the 
country's economic activity should be stressed. Within Latin America, Brazil is, 
in its turn, the most important of the Community's markets. 
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Trade patterns over the years have reflected a deficit for the Community: over 
ECU 5500 m in 1990. Brazil's protectionist policies are to blame, but Brazil 
could also point the finger at protectionist practices on the part of the 
Community, for example with regard to steel and agricultural products (CAP). To 
a certain extent, the Community deficit can also be explained by Brazil's sheer 
competitiveness both in the production of raw materials and that of certain 
industrial goods. 
IV. PROBLEMS FACING THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
Despite its strength, the Brazilian economy is nonetheless burdened with major 
problems. 
1. The very large- and growing- population means that per capita GDP is 
small, approximately US$2280 in 1988, far lower than that of the industrialized 
countries and even of two of the other three MERCOSUL countries, namely Uruguay 
and Argentina with US$2908 and 2685 respectively. 
2. Moreover, these figures hide massive imbalances in the distribution of 
wealth and income. 
With regard to farming, the 1988 census revealed that 'minifundios' (small 
holdings of less than 2 hectares), which account for almost half of Brazil's 
farms, occupy only 2.5% of the total surface area, while 'latifundios' (holdings 
of over 1000 hectares), which represent only 1% of farms, account for almost two 
thirds of the total surface area. 
A comparable imbalance is also to be found with regard to population distribution. 
Two thirds of jobs are located in the south-east of the country, with the state 
of S. Paulo, which has 21% of the population but, accounts for 48% of industrial 
jobs. As a result, the per capita GDP in this area in 1980 was 3.4 times higher 
than in the north-east. 
The privileged status of the south-east, however, has also produced a massive 
influx into the cities (this is particularly true for Sao Paulo, which is 
currently the third most populous city in the world; but what is happening in Rio 
de Janeiro is also worrying) has led to the marginalization of a significant part 
of the population, which to a great extent explains the violence to be found 
there. 
3. Alongside these problems of inequality and marginalization - nor can 
economic fluctuations be separated from the underlying structural conditions - the 
Brazilian economy is in grave difficulty due to inflation. 
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The fight against inflation has therefore come to be a fundamental goal - a 
keystone - of Brazilian economic policy throughout the current process of re-
establishing democracy. This was the case as early as the Cruzado Plan launched 
on 28 February 1986, and it is still the case today with the second Collor de 
Mello Plan. 
The results, however, do not match the effort made, other than during freezes and 
other temporary restrictions on the economy, which in their turn only have 
recessive effects and cause prices to shoot up as soon as they are lifted. After 
an average inflation rate of 200% between 1983 and 1985 and 58% in 1986 (the sole 
year in which inflation was reduced to two figures), prices rose 360% in 1987, 
990% in 1988, 1760% in 1989 and 2360% in 1990. 
Hyper-inflation of this kind was bound to condition the behaviour of consumers and 
of all economic operators, with highly negative consequences for economic 
forecasting and encouraging speculation. 
4. As a result of the economy's imbalances, whether structural or resulting 
from external circumstances, Brazil has run up vast debts, both abroad and at home 
in the public sector. 
4.1. With a debt of US$ 116 173m, Brazil is currently the most heavily indebted 
of all the developing countries. Although it is not the highest per capita debt 
or the heaviest with regard to exports, it is a very considerable debt, in tax 
terms accounting for almost a quarter (24.1%) of Brazilian per capita income. 
This situation is the result of a process which began to accelerate from 1964 
onwards, when the total debt was US$3 OOOm (by 1980 it had already reached 
US$57 OOOm). This was to some extent caused by the commercial deficit of the 
1970s as a result of oil imports and the carrying out of major industrial and 
building programmes. But basically it has worsened as a result of external 
factors, notably the rise in interest rates, which between 1975 and 1982 rose by 
a factor of 5 to between 15 and 17%. The Brazilian economy thus found itself 
over-indebted, with not only repayment but interest payment becoming problematic. 
And growth in its turn was to a large extent determined by the need to transfer 
resources so as to meet debt obligations (according to the Interamerican 
Development Bank, transfer of resources abroad between 1984 and 1989 reached 
between 4 and 5% of the Brazilian GDP). 
A first agreement reached some two years ago between Brazil and the creditor banks 
for the payment of over US$8 OOOm in interest accumulated since 1987 constituted 
a fairly major step, in accordance with the Brady Plan, towards unblocking the 
existing situation . Over and above thi particular Plan, Brazil has, in recent 
years, served as a 'testing ground' for various financial methods for converting 
or repaying the debt, e.g. the debt equity swap (US$5 115m in 1988 and US$4 724m 
in 1989), the controversial buy-back agreements (repurchase of the debt on the 
secondary market), and the debt-for-nature swap which allowed part of the debt 
(US$1 500m) to be converted to support preservation of the Amazon Jungle in a 
pilot project involving the Brazilian Government, the European Community and the 
World Bank (which was supported by the Group of 7). 
On two occasions Brazil decided to suspend payment of interest on its 
commercial debt: February 1987 and September 1989 
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Of far greater importance, however, is the recent agreement of July 1992 with 
international bankers which has allowed the debts to be reduced by up to 35%, with 
payment spread over 30 years. Following the agreements reached with the IMF and 
the Club de Paris, the compromise which has now been reached has helped normalize 
Brazil's financial relations with the international community. 
4.2. At the same time, the Brazilian economy has had to face the problem of the 
scale and growth of the internal debt, which absorbs a large part of the country's 
savings. According to some forecasts, state and local authority debts to the 
Federal Government will exceed US$57 OOOm in 1992, i.e. half of the country's 
external debt. 
To mobilize the savings effort necessary to pay this debt, the authorities have 
been obliged to offer exorbitant interest rates which are turning Brazil into a 
paradise for financial speculation. This has created a link between the problems 
of the external debt and the country's internal public debt. 
5. Finally, it should be noticed that large-scale and uncalled-for state 
intervention in domestic and external economic issues is a weakness of the 
Brazilian economy, adversely affecting its efficiency and competitiveness. 
5.1. Large-scale state intervention in the Brazilian economy has its origins in 
the long period of industrial nationalism, with the launching of major public 
works designed to achieve the economic and political unification of the country, 
e.g. the building of Brasilia and the Amazonian motorway. But the tradition of 
a strong state authority was also channelled into large-scale intervention in 
economic activity, including not only guideline planning for the private sector 
but binding planning for the powerful public enterprise sector, widespread 
regulations on price controls and various other forms of intervention. 
The growth and importance of the public sector was reflected in various ways such 
as participation in forming fixed capital, the percentage importance of public 
spending and even the sheer size of the civil service (1 .7m civil servants work 
for the federal administration). 
5.2. With regard to external questions, too, there is a strong tradition of 
intervention, with the country's development policy being based for a long time 
(1930 - 1979) on import substitution. 
Various instruments were used including high customs tariffs and quantity 
restrictions on imports (in certain cases, with import licences). 
All this encouraged the creation and maintenance of inefficient undertakings in 
various sectors, to the detriment of the wellbeing of Brazilian consumers and the 
efficiency of the country's overall economic activity; a recent example is the 
protection policy on data-processing equipment. 
V. THE CURRENT POLICY OF LIBERALIZING AND OPENING UP THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
Having acknowledged the problems produced by these intervention policies, the 
Brazilian authorities have now resolutely adopted liberalization policies both at 
domestic and external levels. 
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1. First of all, we should stress the privatization policy embodied in a 
current programme for the sale of 64 undertakings. The sale of 15 of these 
undertakings, moreover, has already made a major contribution to liberalizing the 
economy and reducing the internal public debt by an amount of over 
1 · US$3 400m. 
As a means of promoting efficiency and reducing the sheer bulk of the public 
administration, a series of measures proposed or already adopted include the 
cutting of the federal civil service by 400 000 posts. 
Since there is still a need to ensure that public spending is covered, and with 
a view to simplifying the system and making it fair, the draft fiscal reform 
currently being discussed in Congress should be highlighted; it proposes reducing 
the number of existing taxes from 22 to 9 and increasing the GNP fiscal income 
percentage to 3%. 
Mention may also be made of the current reform of Brazilian port services as a 
means of simplifying a very important part of the Brazilian economy which has a 
major effect on international trade (given the preponderant role of transport by 
sea). This will not only bring private ports into existence, but will also allow 
private use to be made of state ports and end the trade unions' monopoly in 
contracting dockers. The intention is to reduce the inefficiency of Brazil's 
ports which cost several times as much as the major ports of the European 
Community and entail export losses of US$5 OOOm per annum. 
2. With regard to the commercial opening up of the Brazilian economy more 
direct measures may be noted, namely the elimination of non-tariff barriers and 
the reduction of customs duties which by 1994 will have a modal value of 20% and 
an average value of 14.2% as against 40% and 32.2% respectively in 1990. Various 
sectors still retain a high level of protection, but there are many sectors in 
which, with values well below those cited above, there will be a major reduction 
in charges. 
We should note the recent abolition of restrictions on imports of data-processing 
equipment as a result of comprehensive pressure both from within and without the 
country, as a result of the extremely negative economic effects produced. 
There is still a major to ensure better safeguards for intellectual property and 
foreign investment in the country by adopting appropriate legislation. 
VI. BRAZILIAN RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE ECOLOGY AND ENERGY FIELDS 
Given the scale of its resources and its programmes, special responsibilities are 
demanded of Brazil in the environmental and energy fields. 
1. In the first instance, the defence and proper exploitation of the Amazon 
Basin, the major lung of the planet, is of overwhelming importance. 
However, as this is a resource which to a great extent belongs to a country 
suffering from the economic and social difficulties set out above, it would be 
unfair to make Brazil alone resposible for its conservation. We would therefore 
highlight the measures which have already been initiated with a view to sharing 
responsibilities fairly, notably the assigning of part of Brazil's external debt 
to funding a programme for the defense of the Amazon Basin. In many cases, it is 
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possible to implement policies which combine proper respect for the need to 
preserve the environment with a rational exploitation of existing resources. 
The pilot programme which the Community is involved in funding is of this kind. 
We should also stress Brazil's very recent role in organizing the Rio Conference, 
at which a call was issued for more detailed attention to be paid to the issues 
at stake, useful experience was exchanged and the participating countries 
committed themselves to safeguarding and promoting both the environment and 
development. 
2. With regard to the issues of nuclear power, Brazil's scientific and 
technological capacity and the dynamic growth referred to above, we should mention 
the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Organization guaranteeing 
controls on the exclusively peaceful objectives of Brazil (and Argentina)' s 
nuclear programmes and controls on the export of nuclear materials so as to 
prevent proliferation. 
VII. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MERCOSUL 
Alongside the strengthening of bilateral relations between the international 
community and Brazil, the efforts at regional integration being made in South 
America are also of the greatest interest. 
Following various unsuccessful experiments in previous decades, prospects for the 
establishment of a common South American market now appear particularly promising, 
following the Buenos Aires Agreement signed on 6 July 1990 by Presidents Carlos 
Menem and Fernando Collar de Mello and open for signature by other countries. 
Uruguay and Paraguay have already joined. 
Its sheer size and potential give Brazil special responsibilities within MERCOSUL, 
which is intended to lead to a more balanced development of the region and greater 
openness in relation to the rest of the world, particularly the EEC. 
VIII. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT 
The agreement which has been reached is a third-generation framework agreement 
similar to those which the Community has already reached with other Latin American 
countries. Its scope is extremely wide (much wider than the 1982 agreement) 
covering, amongst other things, the promotion of trade, general financial and 
economic cooperation, cooperation in science and technology, the environmental, 
social and urban development sectors and the fight against drugs, alongside 
exchanges at cultural, academic, professional training and public administration 
levels. 
Over and above these areas, we should highlight the provision contained in Article 
3, which correctly understood does not of course call into question the 
responsibilities of other countries, namely that the two parties will encourage 
exchanges of views on international affairs of mutual interest. Here, Brazil 
could benefit from the status and experience of the Community, which, however, 
would also stand to benefit from Brazil's standing and diplomatic experience, 
thanks to its traditional position as an intermediary which means that it is often 
particularly well placed in international negotiations. 
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Finally, we should also mention the importance which the agreement under 
discussion attaches to the establishment and progress of MERCOSUL. The Community 
thus stresses the role of this move towards integration (as it does that of other 
such trends) since it is in the interest of all (and, over and above the agreement 
itself, accords with the undertakings given within GATT) to create an area which 
can progressively open up its relations with the rest of the world and 
particularly the Community. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the drawing up of an own-initiative report on economic and commercial 
relations between Brazil and the Community was the result of a motion for a 
resolution tabled in May 1991 by Mr Cano Pinto, the European Parliament was 
already aware of the need to encourage closer links between the two regions. Such 
drawing-together is, generally speaking, desirable with regard to any country, but 
in the case of Brazil, its enormous demographic and economic significance and its 
importance with regard to the ecological stability of the planet make it 
particularly important. At the same time, there is the sensitive issue of 
Brazil's major domestic imbalances and problems which the authorities are seeking 
to resolve in a sustained effort which would not yet have begun or would be very 
much more painful if such cooperation as the Community can provide were not 
forthcoming. 
Parliament, having already expressed itself in these terms on this subject, can 
only extend a warm welcome to the agreement which has now been signed with Brazil. 
It is in keeping with other agreements signed with other Latin American countries, 
and Parliament believes that, in a comprehensive fashion, it meets real needs. 
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============================================================================= I Basic statistics for Brazil I 
1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------l 
I I Brazil I LA-20 I EC I USA I 
1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------l 
!Area {1ooo sq.km) 1 B,512.o 1 19,997.1 1 2,361.6 I 9,372.6 I 
!Population {MIO, 1990) I 153.3 I 442.0 I 342.0 I 249.9 I 
JPopulation/sq.km I 18 I 22 I 145 I 27 I 
!Infant mortality (per 1ooo): 1 57.o 1 1 8.o 1 7.8 I 
!Expectation of life at birth: I 66.3 I 67.4 I 76.1 I 76.3 I 
jDemographic dependency {1): I 64.9 I 68.9 I 48.8 I 51.0 I 
I . I I I I I 
I Gross dam. product ( 1989): I I I I I 
I MIO USD {cur prices/exc rates) I 447,350 1926,242(2)!4,850,973 !5,131,998 I 
I Per capita in PPP USO (~989) I 4,951 I 4,464 I 14,951 I 20,998 I 
I Annua 1 average growth of per cap.! I I I I 
I real gross dam. prod. (:%): I I I I I 
1 1960-199o 1 3.5 1 2.2 1 2.1 1 1.9 1 
1 1980-199o 1 o.5 1 -o.5 1 2.1 1 2.5 1 
1 1989-1990 1 -6.o 1 -2.o 1 3.1 1 2.o 1 
!Balance of paym. (1990, MIO USD): I I I I I 
I Merchandise: exports (fob): I 31,390 j121,723(2)j1,319,532 I 389,540 I 
I Merchandise: imports (fob): I 20,598 I 92,715(2)11,323,466 I 497,660 I 
I Trade balance: I 10,792 I 29,008(2)1 -3,937 I -108,120 I 
I Current account: I -2,032 I -1,007(2)1 -9,250 I -92,160 I 
j Direct investment: I 65 I 6, 197(2)j-15,807(6)j 3,750(6)j 
!Total ext. debc (1990, MIO USD): I 116,173 I 422,592 1----------1----------1 
I Debt service as % of exports of I I I I I 
I goods and services: I 21.8 I 1----------1----------1 
!Consumption of energy per I I I I I 
I capita (kg of coal eq. ): I I I I I 
1 197o 1 43o 1 121 1 3,621 1 10,796 1 
1 198o 1 748 1 1,086 1 4,296 1 1o,237 1 
1 1989 1 79a 1 1,097 1 4,311 1 1o,131 1 
jLabour force (%): I I I I I 
I Agriculture I 25.0 I 25.2 I 6.7 I 2.9 I 
I Industry I 21.4 I 20.1 I 33.4 I 26.9 I 
1 Services 1 34.o 1 32.6 1 59.9 1 10.2 1 
jWomen in labour force(% of totalj 35.1 I 31.9 I 39.7 I 41.5 I 
I labour force), 1988-90 I I I I I 
IAdult literacy rate (%), 1990 I 78 I 82 I 98 I 96 I 
jTV/1000 inhab1tants (1986-88) I 191 I 145 1310 (1989)1 665 I 
ITelephones/1000 inhabitants(1986)l 55 I 51 1395 (1989)1 504 I 
IMotor-cars/1000 inhab. (1986)(3) 176 (1984) I 65 1370 (1989)1 566 I 
Sources: Stat. Yearbock for Latin'America and the Caribbean, 1991, UN 
Bas1c Statistics of the Community, 28th edi., EUROSTAT 
Handbock of int. trade and dev. stat., 1991, UNCTAO 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbock 1991, IMF 
World Development Report 1990, The World Bank 
External Trade, 1-1992, EUROSTAT 
International Financial Statist1cs, IMF 
Indice des prix a la consommation, EUROSTAT 
Human Development Report 1992, UNOP 
Labour Force Survey, Results 1990, EUROSTAT 
World Debt Tables, 1991-92, vol. 2, The World Bank 
Le dossier de l'Europe, 6-7/1991, CCE 
Product1on: European Parliament/Statist1cal Service 
(1) Population under 15 and over 64 as% of pop.between 15 and 64 
(2) excluding Cuba, (3) estimates for the EC, (4) 1988, (5) 1989 
(6) net 
Note: We1ghtings 1n relations to populat1ons 
ANNEX I 
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Community trade with Brazil by commodity classes, 1991 
============================================================= 
EC-imports (cif) EC-exports (fob) 
1,000 ECU - % - 1,000 ECU - % -
============================================================= 
Total 9,377,552 100.0 3,999,051 100.0 
of which: 
SITC 0+1 3,207,195 34.2 285,827 7. 1 
SITC 2+4 2,221,140 23.7 63,620 1.6 
SITC 3 79,480 0.8 35,342 0.9 
SITC 5 455,380 4.9 817,952 20.5 
SITC 7 1,055,008 11 . 3 1,929,872 48.3 
SITC 6+8 2,211,887 23.6 634,405 15.9 
============================================================= 
Source: SIENA, EUROSTAT 
Production: European Parliament/Statistical Service 
Note: SITC 0+1: Food, beverages and tobacco 
SITC 2+4: Raw materials 
SITC 3 Energy 
SITC 5 : Chemicals 
SITC 7 : Machinery and transport eq. 
SITC 6+8: Other manufactured products 
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Community trade with Brazil, 1981-1991 
1,000 ECU 









































1991 (2) 9,378,961 1 4,ooo,339 I -5,378,622 
=============================================================== 
Sources: CRONOS-FRIC and SIENA, EUROSTAT 
Production: European Parliament/Statistical Service 
(1) only D (West) 













































































Source: World Debt Tables 1991-92, Vol. 2, The World Bank 
Production: European Parliament/Statistical Service 
(1) total debt service as% of exports of goods and services 
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Mio ECU % Mio ECU % 
=============================================================== 
1983 24,548 7,099 28.9 18,875 2,363 12.5 
1984 34,228 8,637 25.2 19,277 2,438 12.6 
1985 33,594 9,037 26.9 18,785 2,752 14.6 
1986 22,777 5,979 26.2 15,815 3,507 22.2 
1987 22,715 6,012 26.5 14,365 3, 145 21.9 
1988 28,571 7,903 27.7 13,571 2,929 21.6 
1989 29,644 9,035 30.5 18,179 3,533 19.4 
1990 25,338 7,830 30.9 17,622 3,623 20.6 
=============================================================== 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1991, IMF 




Community trade with Brazil by Member States, 1991 




·1, 000 ECU -%- 1991 1992 I Index 92/91 
================================================================== 
Total 9,378,961 100.0 3,179,199 2,782,691 87.5 
of which: 
France 1,205,731 12.9 451,665 366,046 81.0 
Belg.-Luxbg 714,608 7.6 223,565 229,741 102.8 
Netherlands 1,602,842 17. 1 571,160 418,357 73.2 
Fr Germany 1,876,097 20.0 634,526 611,862 96.4 
Italy 1,481,261 15.8 495,229 459,631 92.8 
Utd. Kingdom 1,194,273 12.7 374,735 382,366 102.0 
Ireland 35,567 0.4 11,674 10,376 88.9 
Denmark 123,250 1.3 45,441 37,459 82.4 
Greece 160,971 1.7 45,750 19,558 42.7 
Portugal 302,493 3.2 119,635 74,606 62.4 





1, 000 ECU -%- 1991 1992 !Index 92/91 
================================================================== 
Total 4,000,339 100.0 1,065,864 1,076,463 101 . 0 
of which: 
France 612,366 15.3 164,041 145,022 88.4 
Belg.-Luxbg 133,794 3.3 32,616 46,432 142.4 
Netherlands 282,402 7.1 67,113 71,860 107. 1 
Fr Germany 1,475,926 36.9 406,938 420,800 103.4 
Italy 731,954 18.3 198,717 218,559 110.0 
Utd. Kingdom 478,225 12.0 145,331 117,884 81. 1 
Ireland 57,038 1.4 5,438 6,438 118.4 
Denmark 70,639 1 .8 9,786 14,540 148.6 
Greece 3,851 0.1 1,790 1,557 87.0 
Portugal 30,256 Ot.8 5,856 7,421 126.7 
Spain 123,889 3. 1 28,239 25,949 91.9 
================================================================== 
Source: SIENA, EUROSTAT 





MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by Mr CANO PINTO 
pursuant to Article 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
ANNEX II 
B3-0882/91 
on economic and commercial relations between the European Economic Community and 
Brazil 
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to the considerable efforts made by Brazil over the last two 
years to restructure and develop its economy, 
B. whereas, in order to combat the foreign debt crisis, Brazil and its creditor 
banks have recently reached an agreement on the payment of more than $8000 
million in interest owed on foreign debt and accumulated during recent years, 
C. having regard to the agreement in principle recently concluded between Brazil, 
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay to establish a common market in the southern 
part of the American continent in 1995, which will enhance the economic 
significance of each of these countries, 
D. whereas Brazil's trade with the Community shows a growing deficit, despite the 
fact that Brazil remains the Community's leading trading partner in Latin 
America, accounting for one third of total trade between the two regions, 
E. whereas the Brazilian Government, the European Community and the World Bank 
have launched a proposed pilot programme for Brazilian Amazonia which could be 
the first step in a more extensive programme covering the entire Amazon region, 
1. Instructs its appropriate committee to study developments in and prospects for 
economic and commerical relations between the Community and Brazil. 
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